International symposium
Cognition and Interpretation

Institute of philosophy,
Zagreb, October 10-11, 2003

Erna Banić-Pajnić
Sight, Seeing and Cognition in Renaissance Neoplatonism

What do we really see? Is that what we see that what really is? Or is the world we see only an internal perceptual copy of the world created by the neural processes in our brain? A critical reflection upon recent scientific research shows that, regardless of all the achievements of the scientific approach to the visual process and the phenomenon of visual perception, the above questions still remain open.
Based on the above, some scientists talk of “the mystery of visual perception”, and some others of the crisis of the scientific approach to visual perception.
In this paper we are primarily interested in the relation between the questions above mentioned and the metaphysical tradition, as well as the approach to the phenomenon of sight and seeing decisive for this tradition. We are also inquireing into whether and the extent to which the contemporary scientific approach to the process of visual perception helped to answer the questions posed by the metaphysical tradition regarding sight and seeing. Our attention is focused primarily upon the period of the renaissance, and, in particular, the standpoints of two representatives of renaissance Neoplatonism – Nicholas of Cusa and Frane Petric. Namely, it is the period of the renaissance exactly which, along the question of WHAT we perceive, intensively started to discusse the question of HOW we perceive. This is, of course, also manifested in the standpoints of the above two renaissance philosophers, although in a different manner in each of them.
In Nicholas of Cusa, we are asking which the motives of his claim that PERCEPTION is only GOD’S CREATION, and that being/to be (esse) is conditioned by “TO PERCEIVE” and “TO BE PERCEIVED” are. We also stress his awareness of the relativity and the quality of having aspects of human perception (which he considers with relation to God’s absolute vision).
In Petric, we show the way in which his argument regarding seeing and sight carried out from the ontological perspective coexists in his Nova de universis philosophia with his argument regarding seeing (carried out in Pancosmia of his Nova de universis philosophia), which is sometimes entirely independent from the first approach. In that part of the Nova de universes… he is primarily interested in the way in which and the conditions under which visual experience is achieved. Thus, in Petric, even in this aspect, renaissance thinking is affirmed as thinking at crossroads. We also point out the ambiguity of his standpoint regarding the sense of visual perception (simultaneous trust and distrust), and the typical renaissance dilemma: in cognising the world, which should be given precedence – perception or reason?
In the end, we are trying to show that these two renaissance philosophers did not, admittedly, contribute to a more precise scientific interpretation of the visual process. However, their onto(theo)logical positions (first and foremost, the thesis of the infiniteness of the world, or rather space) were the presuppositions of the novel way of perceiving the world, as well as perceiving perception itself.

Vid, viđenje i spoznavanje u renesansnom novoplatonizmu

Što uistinu vidimo? Je li ono što vidimo ono što uistinu jest? Ili je svijet što ga vidimo tek interna perceptualna replika svijeta stvorenog neuralnim procesima u našem mozgu?
Kriticki osvrt na znanstvena istraživanja pokazuje da, uza sva dostignuća znanstvenog pristupa vizualnom procesu i fenomenu u vida, gore naznacena pitanja i dalje ostaju otvorena. Na temelju toga neki znanstvenici govore o “misteriju vizualne percepcije”, drugi o krizi znanstvenog pristupa vizualnoj percepciji.
U ovom izlaganju u vezi s vidom interesira nas primarno relacija u kojoj gore naznacena pitanja stoje prema metafizickoj tradiciji i prema za nju odredbenom pristupu fenomenu vida i videnja. Ujedno se hoce ispitati je li i u kojoj mjeri suvremeni znanstveni pristup procesu videnja pomogao rješavanju pitanja što ih u vezi s vidom postavlja metafizicka tradicija. Pritom se koncentriramo na razdoblje renesanse i napose na stavove dvojice predstavnika renesansnog novoplatonizma – Nikole Kuzanskog i Franje Petrica. Upravo je, naime, renesansa razdoblje u kojem se uz pitanje o tome ŠTO vidimo, intenzivno pocinje istraživati i KAKO vidimo, a to se ocituje i u stavovima te dvojice renesansnih filozofa, premda u svakoga na drukciji nacin.
Kod Kuzanskog se pita koji su motivi njegove tvrdnje da je VIĐENJE samo BOŽJE STVARANJE, te da je biti (esse) uvjetovano s “VIDJETI” I “BITI VIĐEN”. Upozorava se i na njegovo uocavanje relativnosti i aspektnosti ljudskog videnja (koje on sagledava u relaciji spram apsolutne Božje vizije).
Kod Petrica se pokazuje kako njegovo raspravljanje o vidu provedeno iz ontologijskog horizonta koegzistira u njegovu djelu Nova de universis philosophia s raspravljanjem o vidu (provedeno u dijelu Novae… naslovljenom s Pancosmia) koje se ponekad posve osamostaljuje u odnosu na prvi pristup. Pritom mu je primaran interes za nacin i uvjete pod kojima se ostvaruje vizualno iskustvo. Tako se kod njega i u tom aspektu renesansno mišljenje afirmira kao mišljenje na raskrižju. Naglašava se ambigvitet njegova stava spram osjetila vida (istovremeno povjerenje i nepovjerenje) te tipicno renesansna dilema oko toga cemu u spoznavanju svijeta dati prednost – vidu ili razumu.
Na kraju se pokazuje kako ova dvojica renesansnih filozofa nisu doduše doprinijela preciznijem znanstvenom tumacenju vizualnog procesa, ali su njihove onto(teo)logijske pozicije (prije svega teza o beskonacnosti svijeta odnosno prostora) bile pretpostavkom novog nacina videnja svijeta, pa onda i videnja videnja.